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Abstract
Influenza viruses mutate frequently, necessitating constant updates of vaccine viruses. To establish 
experimental approaches that may complement the current vaccine strain selection process, we 
selected antigenic variants from human H1N1 and H3N2 influenza virus libraries possessing 
random mutations in the globular head of the haemagglutinin protein (which includes the antigenic 
sites) by incubating them with human and/or ferret convalescent sera to human H1N1 and H3N2 
viruses. Further, we selected antigenic escape variants from human viruses treated with 
convalescent sera and from mice that had been previously immunized against human influenza 
viruses. Our pilot studies with past influenza viruses identified escape mutants that were 
antigenically similar to variants that emerged in nature, establishing the feasibility of our 
approach. Our studies with contemporary human influenza viruses identified escape mutants 
before they caused an epidemic in 2014–2015. This approach may aid in the prediction of 
potential antigenic escape variants and the selection of future vaccine candidates before they 
become widespread in nature.
The haemagglutinin (HA) protein is the major influenza viral antigen1 and the primary target 
of infection-neutralizing antibodies. During influenza virus circulation in humans, the 
antigenicity of the virus gradually changes due to mutations in the globular head of HA, 
necessitating frequent updates of the influenza vaccine2,3. Selection of antigenic variants of 
influenza viruses in humans is believed to be driven by neutralizing antibodies4. Currently, 
seasonal influenza vaccine strains are selected based on the antigenicity of clinical isolates 
and cross-reactive immunity in human populations in combination with genetic and 
epidemiologic data5. This decision has to be made more than six months prior to the onset of 
the influenza season to allow sufficient time for vaccine manufacture. At the time of decision 
making, novel antigenic clusters may not have emerged or may not yet be recognized, 
occasionally resulting in the selection of vaccine strains that differ antigenically from the 
viruses circulating during the subsequent influenza season, leading to low vaccine 
effectiveness6,7. Presently, no experimental or computational methods exist to predict future 
antigenic variants before they emerge in nature. We, therefore, developed an experimental 
strategy to predict the antigenic evolution of human influenza A viruses.
In our approach (Fig. 1), mutant virus libraries with random mutations in the antigenic 
region of HA are screened in vitro with antisera against circulating viruses or in mice 
immunized against the circulating viruses. The antigenic properties of the escape mutants 
are analyzed by using haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays. Antigenic cartography (an 
established method to visualize and analyze HI data8) is then used to identify novel antigenic 
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clusters that may necessitate the update of an influenza vaccine. This experimental approach 
could identify novel antigenic clusters before they emerge in nature and complement the 
current vaccine selection process.
Antigenic evolution of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses
First, we performed a proof-of-concept study to identify and characterize antigenic escape 
variants to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza A (A(H1N1)pdm09) viruses. Eight 
convalescent sera collected from A(H1N1)pdm09-infected individuals in Japan 
(Supplementary Table 1) were mixed with two A(H1N1)pdm09 clinical isolates and escape 
viruses were isolated using plaque assays in Madin-Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells. 
Escape mutants possessed the K153E/N239K, D127E, or K163E mutations (H1 numbering; 
Supplementary Table 2). HI assays with ferret antisera against the escape variants confirmed 
that they were antigenically distinct from their parental viruses (Supplementary Table 3).
To further explore the antigenic landscape, we generated a virus library with random 
mutations in the HA globular head (encompassing amino acids 54–253; Supplementary Fig. 
1 and Supplementary Table 4). This region spans the four antigenic domains including 
antigenic site Sa (positions 124, 125, 153–157, and 159–164)9-12 to which two of the 
selected mutations (K153E and K163E) map. For library generation, we chose the 
A(H1N1)pdm09 A/Norway/3858/2009 HA whose globular head sequence closely matches 
the consensus sequence of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses. The HA mutant library was screened for 
escape mutants with the 14 human convalescent sera indicated in Supplementary Table 1. 
We sequenced the HA gene of more than 500 plaque-purified viruses and identified 92 HA 
mutant clones (Supplementary Table 5), including viruses with the mutations D127E and 
K163E detected in our preliminary experiments. Importantly, no mutations were found in the 
HA gene of wild-type virus after three consecutive passages in MDCK cells, indicating that 
the identified mutations were not selected during virus replication in these cells. HI assays 
confirmed that single amino acid changes at four positions in the Sa antigenic site (153, 154, 
155, 156) caused 4–8-fold reductions in HI titres; Supplementary Table 5). In addition, 2–4-
fold reduction in HI titres were caused by mutations at other positions in antigenic site Sa 
(125, 127, 129 and 163) as well as one position adjacent to site Sb (183). Collectively, these 
data demonstrate the importance of antigenic site Sa for A(H1N1)pdm09 antigenicity.
Previously, Koel et al. demonstrated that amino acid mutations at seven positions (142, 152, 
153, 155, 156, 186, and 190; H1 numbering) of seasonal H3N2 influenza viruses altered 
antigenicity13. Although the primary amino acid sequences of H1 and H3 HAs differ by 
~57%, their antigenic sites substantially overlap9,10,14. We, therefore, included these 
positions in our analysis of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses. On the basis of sequence comparisons 
of seasonal H1N1 vaccine virus strains from 1977 to 2007, we also selected position 141 
(identified in our preliminary escape mutant selection) and position 187 (located close to key 
antigenic positions 186 and 190) for further analysis.
Next, we generated A/Norway/3858/2009 HA libraries that represent all 20 amino acids at 
each of the 15 selected positions (i.e., HA positions 125, 127, 129, 141, 142, 152, 153, 154, 
155, 156, 163, 183, 186, 187, and 190) (Supplementary Fig. 1 and Supplementary Table 6). 
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These HA mutant libraries were individually screened with ferret antisera as shown in 
Supplementary Table 7. Libraries for which we did not have escape mutant-specific antisera 
(HA positions 141, 142, 152, 186, 187, and 190) were screened with antiserum to wild-type 
virus; libraries for which we isolated antigenic escape mutants in our earlier experiments 
(namely, HA positions 125, 127, 129, 153, 154, 155, 156, 163, and 183) were screened with 
antisera to the N125D, D127E, N129D, K153E, K154N, G155E, N156D, K163E, or S183P 
escape mutants, respectively, to obtain additional mutants at the respective positions. For 
each screen, at least 11 plaque-purified viruses were characterized for their HA sequence 
and antigenicity (Supplementary Table 8). Mutations at positions 153–156 reduced HI titres 
up to 16-fold, suggesting that these HA positions play a major role in A(H1N1)pdm09 HA 
antigenicity. We did not identify antigenic escape mutants at positions 141, 163, or 187.
Our data suggested a key role for amino acid positions 153–156 in A(H1N1)pdm09 
antigenicity; therefore, we generated HA mutant libraries with random mutations at two, or 
all four, of these positions (Supplementary Table 6). Random mutations at positions 153–
156 were also combined with the D127E mutation in HA. This mutation is located near the 
Sa antigenic site, was selected in our screens (Supplementary Tables 2 and 5), and has been 
detected in several natural A(H1N1)pdm09 isolates. Virus libraries possessing mutations at 
two sites were screened with 50:50 mixtures of antisera against escape mutants at the 
respective positions (Supplementary Table 7); libraries possessing mutations at four or five 
sites were screened with a human serum (A163) obtained from an individual vaccinated with 
a monovalent, inactivated split-virus vaccine against A/California/07/2009 
(A(H1N1)pdm09) (Supplementary Table 7). More than 320 escape mutants were isolated 
that exhibited reduced reactivity with antiserum against the wild-type virus (Supplementary 
Tables 9–11). Among those, certain amino acid changes were found at higher frequency 
(e.g., the N156G mutation). Sequence analysis of mutagenized plasmids used for virus 
library generation did not show sequence biases (Supplementary Tables 12 and 13); 
therefore, more frequently detected variants were most likely selected due to immune 
pressure and/or structural changes that conferred a fitness advantage.
We also carried out antigenic selection studies in which A/California/04/2009 virus-infected 
mice (Supplementary Table 14) were challenged with the mutant HA virus library 
possessing random amino acid changes at positions 153–156 together with the D127E 
mutation. We sequenced the HA gene of 53 escape viruses and detected several amino acid 
combinations that had also been selected in our in vitro antigenic selection experiments 
(Supplementary Table 15). These findings suggest that our in vitro selection experiments 
with human sera in part reflect in vivo immune evasion mechanisms.
To obtain a comprehensive picture of the antigenic properties of selected escape variants, 
469 viruses (including 447 HA escape variants selected in this study) were characterized in 
HI assays with a panel of ferret antisera against H1N1 influenza viruses (Supplementary 
Table 16). The HI data were then analyzed using antigenic cartography8,13,15,16. Many of the 
escape mutants form a single cluster approximately four antigenic units (representing a 16-
fold reduction in HI titre) away from wild-type A/Norway/3858/2009 virus (Fig. 2a). Thus, 
although our in vivo selection studies resulted in the isolation of 28 different combinations 
of amino acid changes (Supplementary Table 15), they all localized to the same novel 
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antigenic cluster. Mutations at positions 153–156 had the greatest impact on antigenicity 
(Fig. 3). Importantly, single amino acid changes are sufficient to produce antigenic variants 
with >16-fold difference in HI titre (Fig. 2b and Supplementary Fig. 2).
To exclude the possibility that the antisera did not adequately resolve the antigenicity of the 
escape mutants in the antigenic cluster we identified, we raised additional ferret antisera 
against 10 antigenic variants that lie in the new cluster or were outliers of the original cluster 
(Supplementary Fig. 3; Supplementary Table 17). HI assays with these antisera did not result 
in appreciable changes to overall relationships or placement of any of the viruses 
(Supplementary Fig. 3b). Thus, the identification of only one new antigenic cluster is a valid 
finding and not an artifact of poor resolution of antigenic differences by the antisera used in 
this study. Further analysis also revealed that the accumulation of mutations at positions 
tested here resulted in viruses that are increasingly distinct from the parental virus 
(Supplementary Fig. 4); however, the effect of individual mutations cannot be summed to 
predict the effect of combinations of mutations (Supplementary Fig. 5).
Since our study identified several potential A(H1N1)pdm09 escape variants, we analyzed the 
antigenicity of 2,555 recently circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 strains derived from routine WHO 
surveillance from 2009–2013. Isolates from each season were analyzed separately due to the 
lack of common antigens and antisera between the datasets (Fig. 2c, Supplementary Fig. 6a–
e). Over 6% of the strains were antigenically different (i.e., more than 4-fold difference in HI 
titre) from the vaccine strain, A/California/07/2009. The antigenic variation seen among 
these viruses was representative of that seen in A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses currently circulating 
worldwide17. The antigenic differences found were identical to those identified with 
experimentally selected antigenic variants in this study in terms of distance and direction 
from the main antigenic cluster (typified by the vaccine strain) as well as the formation of a 
single antigenically distinct cluster. No mutations at any of the other sites identified by Koel 
et al. were observed13. All but two of the antigenic variants identified among circulating 
strains contained mutations shown in this study to cause antigenic change [K153E, K154E, 
G155E or N156D]. The exceptions were two isolates of the same virus: egg-passaged A/
Iraq/8529/2009 (E3) and MDCK cell-passaged A/Iraq/8529/2009 (MDCK1). To directly 
compare the two datasets, we tested 20 field viruses against a subset of ferret antisera used 
in this study and generated a new antigenic map that merged the datasets from both 
experimentally generated mutants (Fig. 2b) and field strains (Fig. 2c) (Fig. 2d; a zoomable 
version is provided in Supplementary Fig. 6f). Isolates that were antigenically advanced, but 
had no sequence information, were subsequently sequenced. The antigenic properties of 
these viruses were consistent between the two datasets and demonstrated that a laboratory-
based antigenic selection procedure can produce variants seen in surveillance samples.
Our experimental data demonstrate that the amino acids at positions 153–156 of HA are 
critical for antigenicity. This finding is consistent with several studies showing that a small 
proportion of A(H1N1)pdm09 clinical strains with amino acid changes in HA positions 
153–157 showed antigenic drift compared with the A/California/07/2009-like reference 
viruses18-20. Moreover, mutations at positions 153–157 of HA have been detected after in 
vitro passage of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses in the presence of monoclonal antibodies21,22 or 
after A(H1N1)pdm09 passage in suboptimally vaccinated ferrets20. The HA positions 153–
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156 are located at the edge of the receptor-binding pocket; hence, the amino acids at these 
positions may affect receptor-binding avidity and specificity20,23, in addition to antigenicity.
To determine whether the HA mutants selected in our study and the field strains from the 
new antigenic cluster could indeed evade immunity to current A(H1N1)pdm09 strains, mice 
were immunized by infection or vaccination with an A(H1N1)pdm09 virus (Supplementary 
Figs 7 and 8). Four weeks later, the mice were challenged with the viruses indicated in 
Supplementary Figs 9 and 10 (see also Supplementary Tables 18 and 19). No virus was 
detected on day 4 post-challenge in the lungs of immunized mice challenged with A/
California/04/2009 or A/Norway/3858/2009 wild-type viruses (Supplementary Figs 9 and 
10). By contrast, 12 of the 13 antigenic variants tested replicated in the lungs of immunized 
mice. Similarly, several viruses representing antigenic variants isolated in our study and 
found in field strains also replicated in mice immunized against current A(H1N1)pdm09 
viruses (Supplementary Fig. 10).
Next, we tested whether the selected antigenic variants could evade immunity to the current 
A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses in ferrets, a commonly used animal model in the evaluation of 
influenza vaccines. Ferrets were immunized by infection with A/California/04/2009 virus. 
Pre-challenge serum HI titres were between 1:160 and 1:640 (Supplementary Fig. 11). 
Twelve months later, ferrets were challenged with either A/California/04/2009 control virus, 
three different mutant viruses that replicated in mice immunized with wild-type virus (Fig. 
4), or with an A/Norway/3568/2009 reassortant virus possessing HA changes identified in a 
field strain (this mutant virus replicated in mice immunized with the wild-type A/California/
04/2009 virus or with the A/California/07/2009 split vaccine) (Fig. 4). No virus was detected 
from the nasal washes collected from the immunized ferrets challenged with A/California/
04/2009 virus. By contrast, the three antigenic mutants identified in our in vivo screens and 
the antigenic mutant with HA changes found in the field strain replicated efficiently in 
immunized ferrets. Thus, viruses possessing these mutations in HA may have the potential 
to cause epidemics in the future.
As influenza viruses evolve and amino acid substitutions become fixed within an antigenic 
cluster, these changes in genetic background may affect the future evolution of the viruses. If 
so, antigenic evolution studies should be updated repeatedly with contemporary viruses.
Retrospective antigenic evolution of H3N2 viruses
To further test the potential of our experimental approach to identify future antigenic drift of 
influenza viruses, we carried out a retrospective study with human H3N2 viruses, whose 
antigenic evolution is well characterized8,13,24,25. The antigenic transition from the Sydney/
1997 (SY97) cluster to the Fujian/2002 (FU02) cluster required two amino acid changes: 
HA-H155T and HA-Q156H13. To assess whether this cluster transition could be 
recapitulated experimentally, we generated a virus library with random mutations in the HA 
globular head of A/Hong Kong/CUHK5250/2002 (CUHK5250, H3N2), a representative of 
the SY97 cluster that encodes HA-155H-156Q (the virus library was generated with the NA 
gene of CUHK5250 virus and the internal genes of A/Puerto Rico/8/34, H1N1). Our 
sequence analysis of human H3N2 viruses also revealed several natural isolates (for 
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example, A/Kwangju/219/2002; Kwangju/219), that belong to the SY97 cluster, but encode 
the FU02-like residue HA-155T. This finding suggests that the SY97-to-FU02 transition 
may have occurred in two steps: from 155H-156Q to 155T-156Q to 155T-156H. Since 
evolutionary ‘advanced’ viruses (i.e., those with an ‘intermediate’ amino acid sequence) may 
be the founders of the next antigenic cluster, we also generated a virus library for 
Kwangju/219 (since the NA proteins of Kwangju/219 and CUHK5250 differ by only two 
amino acids, the CUHK5250 NA gene was used for Kwangju/219 library generation). In 
vitro screens for escape mutants were carried out individually with 9 human sera collected in 
Japan in 1999 (for the CUHK5250 library; Supplementary Table 20), or with ferret 
antiserum to CUHK5250 (for the Kwangju/219 library; Supplementary Table 21) to select 
escape mutants from the SY97 cluster; from these screens, we isolated 61 and 110 escape 
variants, respectively. The antigenic screen of the CUHK5250 mutant library did not result 
in the isolation of the cluster-transitioning H155T-Q156H mutations. By contrast, nine of the 
110 variants isolated from the Kwangju/219 mutant library acquired the cluster-defining 
HA-Q156H mutation which, together with the HA-155T residue encoded by Kwangju/219, 
created the FU02 cluster motif of HA-H155T-Q156H.
Next, HI assays were performed for 20 reference strains and for 32 and 56 mutant viruses 
isolated from the CUHK5250 and Kwangju/219 screens, respectively (we focused on viruses 
with mutations in amino acid positions known to affect antigenicity; Supplementary Tables 
20 and 21). All Kwangju/219 mutants that inherently encoded HA-155T and acquired the 
HA-Q156H mutation localized to the edge of the FU02 cluster (Fig. 5, red triangles). Most 
CUHK5250 mutants did not shift to the FU02 cluster, as expected by the absence of the HA-
H155T-Q156H mutations. However, one CUHK5250 mutant possessing HA-Q156H-H183L 
mutations mapped to the outer edge of the FU02 cluster (Fig. 5, red rhombus). This variant 
is located in the antigenic map close to the cluster of Kwangju/219 mutants encoding 
HA-155T-156H (Fig. 5, red triangles). Hence, our in vitro antigenic selection identified the 
same antigenic drift mutants that occurred in nature (i.e., HA-H155T-Q156H) and were 
critical for the transition from the SY97 cluster to the FU02 cluster.
Antigenic evolution of contemporary H3N2 viruses
In February 2014, the WHO recommended an A/Texas/50/2012(H3N2)-like virus (TX/50) 
as a vaccine strain for the 2014–2015 influenza season in the Northern hemisphere. From 
March to September 2014, an increasing percentage of antigenically drifted H3N2 variants 
belonging to clades 3C.3a or 3C.2a was reported26. The antigenic difference between TX/50 
and the novel clade 3C.3a and 3C.2a viruses was most likely correlated with HA-F159S and 
HA-F159Y mutations, respectively27. The novel antigenic clusters were dominant in most 
parts of the world by late 2014 and were responsible for the low vaccine effectiveness of the 
H3N2 component of the 2014–2015 influenza vaccine28. In February 2015, the WHO 
therefore recommended replacing TX/50 with a clade 3C.3a vaccine virus28. During the first 
half of 2015, viruses of clade 3C.2a became dominant over those of clade 3C.3a29. In 
September 2015, the WHO therefore recommended A/Hong Kong/4801/2014 (HK/4801; 
clade 3C.2a, encoding HA-159Y) as a novel vaccine virus29.
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To identify antigenically advanced variants of contemporary human H3N2 viruses, we 
generated a virus library possessing random amino acid changes at HA positions 63–252 
(H3 numbering) of TX/50, the WHO-recommended vaccine virus at that time. The library 
was screened with 10 human antisera collected in December 2013–January 2014, and with 
three mixtures of these antisera based on the age of the donor (Supplementary Table 22). We 
identified 139 different potential escape mutants (Supplementary Tables 23 and 24); the 
most frequently mutated amino acid position was HA-159, consistent with the role of this 
amino acid position in recent cluster transitions. For antigenic analysis, we chose a subset of 
24 antigenic mutants that encoded amino acid changes frequently detected in these screens 
and/or amino acid changes known to affect antigenicity (indicated by HI titres in 
Supplementary Tables 23 and 24). HI assays were conducted in the presence of 20 nM 
oseltamivir with 19 reference antisera, and with 19 reference strains. The resulting HI data 
were merged with data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (Fig. 6). 
The TX/50 antigenic cluster (encoding HA-159F; blue) and the minor 3C.3b cluster (also 
encoding HA-159F, yellow) are antigenically closely related, whereas the 3C.3a cluster 
(characterized by HA-159S; green) and the now dominant 3C.2a cluster (characterized by 
HA-159Y; red) are antigenically distinguishable from TX/50. Among the experimentally 
derived escape variants (shown in numbered mid-sized circles), the majority of antigenically 
‘advanced’ mutants [i.e., those that shifted from the vaccine virus by more than two grid 
units (i.e., four HI units)] moved towards the currently dominant 3C.2a cluster, represented 
by the A/Hong Kong/4801/2014 vaccine virus (#31); some of these possessed the HA-159Y 
mutation. However, not all of the antigenic escape variants that shifted towards the current 
cluster encode a mutation at HA-159. In fact, escape mutant #27 (closest to the vaccine 
strain, #31) encodes mutations HA-K189E and -N225D, which are known to affect antigenic 
and receptor-binding specificity, respectively13,30,31. The HA-N225D mutation is present in 
most viruses belonging to clade 3C.2a; however, the HA-K189E mutation has not been 
detected in human H3N2 influenza viruses collected from January 1, 2014 to February 20, 
2016, based on sequence searches in GISAID (http://platform.gisaid.org) and the Influenza 
Research Database (www.fludb.org). Collectively, these findings indicate that although our 
approach may not always identify the exact sequence of the next epidemic strains, it can 
predict the antigenic properties of future epidemic strains.
Discussion
With the current vaccine selection process (based on comparisons of sequence and antigenic 
data available at the time of the WHO consultations on vaccine strain selection), uncertainty 
remains as to whether the recommended vaccine virus will provide protective immunity 
against the next epidemic strain. Here, we provide a methodology that identified H1N1 and 
H3N2 antigenic clusters similar to those observed in nature. These data can be generated 
before the variants are detected in nature; in this regard, our approach is conceptually 
different from methods that predict which circulating variants may become dominant32-35. 
Our method may therefore improve the current WHO influenza vaccine selection process. 
These in vitro selection studies are highly predictive of the antigenic evolution of H1N1 and 
H3N2 viruses in human populations. Hence, a limited number of experimental antigenic 
screens may be sufficient to identify potential future clusters. We found that genetic 
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background can be important for antigenic evolution, as with the SY97-FU02 antigenic 
cluster transition. To put methods like ours into practice, it will likely be necessary to keep 
the predictions up to date by reapplying the methodology as new clades emerge. We cannot 
predict the HA sequence of the next epidemic strain, and (compensatory) mutations in NA 
may also affect antigenicity; however, our methodology may be sufficient to predict the next 
antigenic cluster for proactive vaccine development.
Methods
Viruses and cells
293T human embryonic kidney cells were maintained in DMEM supplemented with 10% 
fetal bovine serum. MDCK cells were grown in MEM containing 5% newborn calf serum. 
After infection with influenza viruses, MDCK cells were maintained in MEM containing 
0.3% BSA and 0.5 μg/ml TPCK-trypsin. A/Norway/3206-3/2009 (H1N1), A/Norway/
3858/2009 (H1N1), and A/Yokohama/UT-K1205T/2009 (H1N1) were amplified in MDCK 
cells to generate stock viruses. A/Norway/3568/2009 (H1N1) and A/California/04/2009 
(H1N1) were generated using reverse genetics techniques as described36. To generate A/
Hong Kong/CUHK5250/2002 (CUHK5250, H3N2), and A/Texas/50/2012 (TX/50, H3N2; 
cell culture-grown; see #1 in Fig. 6) virus libraries, the HA and NA genes, or just the HA 
gene, of these viruses were combined with the remaining six or seven genes of A/Puerto 
Rico/8/34 (H1N1) virus. To generate A/Kwangju/219/2002 (Kwangju/219, H3N2) virus 
libraries, we combined the Kwangju/219 HA gene, the CUHK5250 NA gene (note that the 
NA proteins of Kwangju/219 and CUHK5250 differ by only two amino acids), and the 
remaining genes of A/Puerto Rico/8/34 virus. The cell lines used here were maintained in 
our laboratory and were negative for mycoplasma contamination; they are not listed in the 
database of commonly misidentified cell lines.
Generation of virus libraries with random mutations in the HA globular head region
The cDNAs for the HA gene of A/Norway/3858/2009, CUHK5250, Kwangju/219, and 
TX/50 viruses were randomly mutagenized using error-prone PCR with the GeneMorph II 
kit (Stratagene, La Jolla, California, USA) (note that the sequence of our CUHK5250 HA 
gene differed by two silent nucleotide changes from the sequence reported in the database). 
The randomized coding regions for amino acid positions 54–253 (for the H1 viruses; H1 
numbering) or 63–252 (for the H3 viruses) of HA were replaced with the corresponding 
region of the respective parental HA cDNA plasmid using a PCR-based cloning technique. 
Unbiased library composition and the targeted mutation rate (1-2 amino acid substitutions 
per molecule) were confirmed by sequence analysis. The sizes of our E. coli libraries were 9 
× 106, 1.3 × 107, 1.4 × 107, and 1.5 × 106 colony-forming units for A/Norway/3858/2009, 
CUHK5250, Kwangju/219, and TX/50, respectively. The randomized A/Norway/3858/2009 
HA plasmid library was then used to generate a virus library in the genetic background of 
the closely related A/Norway/3568/2009 virus. The CUHK5250 and Kwangju/219 HA 
plasmid libraries were used to generate virus libraries in the genetic background of the 
CUHK5250 NA gene and the remaining A/Puerto Rico/8/34 virus genes. The TX/50 HA 
plasmid library was used to generate a virus library in the genetic background of the 7 
remaining A/Puerto Rico/8/34 virus genes.
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Generation of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus libraries representing all amino acids at a defined 
position
For random mutagenesis at a defined amino acid position, the HA plasmid was amplified 
with degenerate PCR primers representing mixtures of all four nucleotides at the three 
positions of the respective codon. The PCR products were self-ligated and transformed into 
E. coli, resulting in 104–106 colony-forming units per library. Virus libraries were generated 
as described above. The titres of the virus libraries were 3.4 × 104–7.0 × 107 PFU/ml 
(Supplementary Table 6).
Generation of reassortant viruses possessing HA and NA genes derived from 
A(H1N1)pdm09 field strains
Plasmids for the expression of the HA and NA genes of field strains were generated by site-
directed PCR mutagenesis using cDNAs for the HA and NA genes of A/Norway/3858/2009, 
A/Norway/3568/2009, or A/California/04/2009 as templates (for A/Qingdao/1610/2009, 
whose NA gene sequence is not publicly available, the NA gene of A/Norway/3568/2009 
was used; for A/Miyazaki/40/2011 and A/Okinawa/41/2010, whose HA2 sequences are not 
publicly available, chimeric HA genes with the HA2 sequence of A/Norway/3568/2009 
were constructed and used). The resulting plasmids were combined with plasmids encoding 
the remaining six genes of A/Norway/3568/2009 virus; viruses were generated as described 
above.
In vitro selection of A(H1N1)pdm09 antigenic escape mutants from clinical isolates
Clinical virus isolates (A/Norway/3206-3/2009 or A/Yokohama/UT-K1205T/2009) were 
mixed with 2-fold serial dilutions of human convalescent sera and incubated at 4°C 
overnight. After virus neutralization, virus-serum mixtures were inoculated onto MDCK 
cells and incubated at 37°C for 1 h. After removal of the inoculum, cells were cultured for 
2–4 days. Then, culture supernatants were collected from cells with the highest 
concentration of antiserum at which a cytopathic effect was observed. Viruses in the 
supernatants were plaque-purified in MDCK cells and the HA genes of the purified viruses 
were sequenced.
In vitro selection of antigenic escape mutants from A(H1N1)pdm09 or H3N2 virus libraries
Virus libraries were mixed with undiluted or 2-fold serial dilutions of the respective ferret or 
human sera, with the exception of the H3N2 TX/50 virus library, which was mixed with 
individual or mixed human sera, and incubated at 4°C overnight. The virus-serum mixtures 
were diluted and subjected to plaque assays in MDCK cells grown in 6-well plates. 
Antigenic escape variants were isolated from wells that showed inhibition of virus infection 
(<10 plaques per well), and the HA genes of the isolated viruses were sequenced.
Animal experiments
All animal experiments were approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee 
(IACUC) at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The facilities where this research was 
conducted are fully accredited by the Association for the Assessment and Accreditation of 
Laboratory Animal Care International (AAALAC). The animal experiments described in this 
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study were not designed to generate data sets for statistical analysis; hence, the sample size 
was small and randomization and blinding were not carried out.
In vivo selection of A(H1N1)pdm09 antigenic escape mutants from virus libraries
Six-week-old female BALB/c (Jackson Laboratory, Bar Harbor, Maine, USA) and 
C57BL6/J (Jackson Laboratory) mice were used in this study. Three mice per group were 
immunized by intranasal infection with 10 PFU (BALB/c mice) or 101.5 PFU (C57BL6/J 
mice) (50 μl) of A/California/04/09 virus. Four weeks later, we determined the HI titres of 
mouse sera against A/California/04/09 virus. Then, animals were challenged by intranasal 
infection with 106 PFU (50 μl) of either A/California/04/09 virus (control) or the virus 
library possessing the D127E mutation in HA and random mutations at amino acid position 
153–156 of HA. On day 4 post-challenge, virus titres in mouse lungs were determined using 
plaque assays in MDCK cells. Viruses recovered from the lungs of successfully immunized 
(HI antibody titres ≥40) and virus library-challenged mice were plaque purified prior to HA 
sequence analysis.
Challenge experiments in mice
Six-week-old female C57BL6/J mice were immunized by intranasal infection with 101.5 
PFU (50 μl) of A/California/04/2009 virus or by two vaccinations (with a two-week interval) 
of a commercial A/California/07/2009 HA split vaccine (CSL, Parkville, Australia, 1.5 μg in 
50 μl). Four weeks later, serum HI titres were determined. Three-to-four mice per group with 
HI antibody titres ≥40 (for mice immunized by virus infection) or ≥160 (for mice 
immunized by vaccination) were challenged by intranasal infection with 106 PFU (50 μl) of 
the oseltamivir-sensitive A/California/04/2009 or A/Norway/3858/2009 control viruses, 
representative antigenic escape mutants, or A/Norway/3568/2009-based reassortant viruses 
possessing changes in HA detected in field strains. On day 4 post-challenge, virus titres in 
mouse lungs were determined using plaque assays in MDCK cells
Challenge experiments in ferrets
Six- to ten-month-old female ferrets (Triple F Farms, Sayre, Pennsylvania, USA) that were 
serologically negative by haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay for currently circulating 
human influenza viruses were infected by intranasal inoculation with 500 PFU (500 μl) of 
A/California/04/2009 virus. Twelve months later, serum HI titres were determined. Three or 
four ferrets per group with HI antibody titres between 160 and 640 were challenged by 
intranasal infection with 107 PFU (500 μl) of A/California/04/2009, three antigenic escape 
mutants selected in the in vivo screens, or an A/Norway/3568/2009 reassortant virus with 
HA changes identified in a field strain (Fig. 4 and Supplementary Fig. 11). The nasal washes 
of the challenged ferrets were collected daily from day 1 to day 8 post-challenge. Virus titres 
in the nasal washes were determined using plaque assay in MDCK cells.
Generation of ferret antisera
We used 6–10-month-old female ferrets (Triple F Farms, Sayre, Pennsylvania, USA) that 
were serologically negative by haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay for currently 
circulating human influenza viruses. One or two ferrets per group were anaesthetized 
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intramuscularly with ketamine and xylazine (5–30 mg and 0.2–6 mg/kg of body weight, 
respectively) and inoculated intranasally with 107 PFU (500 μl) of wild-type or mutant 
A(H1N1)pdm09, seasonal H1N1, swine H1N1, or human H3N2 virus. Three-to-four weeks 
later, ferrets were euthanized and sera were collected for subsequent use in HI assays or the 
selection of escape mutants.
Antiserum treatment
Human or ferret serum (100 μl) was treated with 300 μl of receptor-destroying enzyme 
(RDE; Denka Seiken Co., Ltd., Tokyo, Japan) at 37°C for 18–24 h. To denature the RDE 
solution, the serum-RDE mixture was incubated at 56°C for 30–60 min. After denaturation, 
600 μl of sterile PBS and 100 μl of pelleted turkey red blood cells (TRBCs) were added and 
the mixture was incubated at room temperature for 60 min; during that time, the suspension 
was mixed every 10 min. The mixture was then centrifuged at 3000 rpm at 4°C for 5 min. 
Supernatants were aliquoted and stored at −20°C for use in HI assays. To confirm that all 
non-specific binding had been removed, 25 μl of PBS and 25 μl of treated serum were mixed 
with 50 μl of 0.5% TRBCs and incubated at room temperature for 45 min. If no 
hemagglutination was detected, the serum could be used for HI assays; otherwise, the 
antiserum treatment was repeated.
HI assays
HI titrations were performed in 96-well U bottom microtiter plates (Thermo Scientific, 
Rochester, New York, USA). Sera were serially diluted 2-fold with PBS and then mixed 
with the amount of virus equivalent to 8 haemagglutination units, followed by incubation at 
room temperature for 30 min. Finally, 50 μl of 0.5% TRBCs were added. To screen TX/50 
variants, sera were serially diluted 2-fold with PBS containing a final concentration of 20 
nM oseltamivir, mixed with the amount of virus equivalent to 4 haemagglutination units, and 
incubated at room temperature for 30 min; finally, 50 μl of 0.75% guinea pig red blood cells 
with 20 nM oseltamivir was added. Serum, virus, and erythrocytes were gently mixed and 
incubated at room temperature for 45 min. Titres were recorded as the inverse of the highest 
antibody dilution that inhibited 8 or 4 agglutinating units of virus, respectively.
Antigenic cartography of escape mutants
Antigenic maps were constructed using the antigenic cartography method8. The HI titres 
were mathematically transformed to create a table of antigenic distances, using the equation 
Dij=b-log2(Hij), where Hij is the titre of antigen i against serum j, and b is the logarithm of 
the maximum titre against serum j. The error function (Dij-dij)^2 was minimized where dij is 
the Euclidean distance between two points on the map.
Sequence analysis
Viral RNA was extracted from MDCK cell supernatant or purified plaques using the QIAmp 
viral RNA mini kit (Qiagen, Valencia, California, USA) or the MagMAX™-96 Viral RNA 
Isolation Kit (Ambion, Austin, Texas, USA). cDNAs were synthesized from vRNAs by 
reverse transcription with Uni12 primer37, and amplified by PCR with gene-specific primers. 
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Sequencing was performed on an Applied Biosystems DNA analyzer at the Biotechnology 
Center of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1. Schematic overview of our experimental approach to predict the antigenic evolution of 
human influenza A viruses
Virus libraries possessing random or targeted mutations in the antigenic region of HA are 
screened in vitro with antisera against human 2009 H1N1 viruses or in vivo in mice 
immunized with a human 2009 H1N1 virus. Mutant viruses are analyzed by using 
haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays, and antigenic cartography is then used to identify 
viruses that differ antigenically from the parent cluster.
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Figure 2. HA antigenic cartography
An antigenic map, a geometrical representation of the HI assay data. If two viruses have 
similar HI titres against a panel of sera, then they are close to each other on the map. 
Conversely, if two viruses differ in their HI titres against a panel of sera, then they will be far 
apart on the map. Each grid square corresponds to a 2-fold change in HI titre (the x and y 
axes represent antigenic distances). (a) Map for the 447 mutant viruses (blue circles) and 42 
ferret antisera (squares) together with A/Norway/3858/2009 (cyan circle), 5 wild-type 
A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses (red circles), 10 A(H1N1)pdm09-based reassortant viruses that 
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possess changes in HA at positions 153–156 detected in field strains (orange circles), 4 
seasonal H1N1 viruses (magenta circles), and two H1N1 swine viruses (pink circles). (b) 
Map focused on A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses (light blue circles) and ferret antisera (squares) 
from this study. Viruses with mutations at positions 153–157 in HA are colored by amino 
acid type at that position (note: viruses may have more than one mutation; this can result in a 
change in position [see Supplementary Figs 2 and 5]). (c) Antigenic map of 862 
A(H1N1)pdm09 circulating strains from WHO surveillance in 2009 and 2010 (See key in 
b). For some circulating viruses, the identity of one or more amino acids at positions 153–
157 was unclear in sequence data (pale yellow circles). Circulating viruses for which the HA 
sequence has not been determined are shown as light grey circles. Fig. 2c is available as a 
labeled, zoomable pdf in the Supplementary figures – see Supplementary Fig. 6a. (d) 
Antigenic map of the combined HI data from Fig. 2b,c. This map includes A(H1N1)pdm09 
viruses from the mutant screens in this study (light blue circles); A(H1N1)pdm09-based 
reassortant viruses that possess changes in HA at positions 153–156 detected in field strains 
(orange circles); and circulating viruses from WHO surveillance studies with HA sequence 
data (pale orange circles) or without HA sequence data (light grey circles). Circulating 
A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses tested with a subset of sera from this study are shown as red circles. 
Fig. 2d is available as a labeled, zoomable pdf in the Supplementary figures – see 
Supplementary Fig. 6f.
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Figure 3. Structural basis of antigenic changes
Structure of the HA of A/California/04/2009; PDB 3UBN38. Amino acid positions at which 
single mutations result in appreciable antigenic change are shown as increasingly darker 
shades of green. The human-type receptor analog, 6'-SLN (6'-sialyl-N-acetyllactosamine), is 
shown in orange.
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Figure 4. Immune evasion in ferrets by HA mutations identified in this study or found in a field 
strain
Ferrets were infected intranasally by inoculation with 500 PFU of A/California/04/2009 
virus. Twelve months later, serum HI titres against A/California/04/2009 were determined 
(Supplementary Fig. 11) and ferrets were challenged with 107 PFU of A/California/04/2009 
(a), with representative antigenic escape mutants selected in the in vivo screens (b, c, d), or 
with a A/Norway/3568/2009-based reassortant virus possessing changes in HA at positions 
155 and 156 detected in a field strain (e) (see Supplementary Tables 18 and 19). Shown are 
nasal wash virus titers collected from day 1 to day 5 post-challenge (all nasal wash samples 
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collected on days 6–8 post-challenge were negative for virus). Dashed lines, virus detection 
limit (1 log10 PFU/ml).
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Figure 5. Antigenic map of CUHK5250 and Kwangju/219 H3N2 escape mutants
The antigenic map was generated as described in the legend to Fig. 2. Wild-type strains 
belonging to the Wuhan 1995, Sydney 1997, or Fujian 2002 clusters are shown in green, 
magenta, or yellow, respectively. Escape mutants selected from the CUHK5250 and 
Kwangju/219 libraries are shown as diamonds and triangles, respectively, and colored by the 
presence of a mutation at position 145 (cyan), 155 (orange), 156 (red), 158 (green), 189 
(cream), or 193 (wheat), which were recently found to be antigenically important for human 
H3N2 virus evolution13.
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Figure 6. Antigenic map of TX/50 H3N2 escape mutants
The antigenic map was generated as described in the legend to Fig. 2. Surveillance samples 
are shown in small circles; experimentally derived antigenic variants are shown in mid-sized 
circles; vaccine viruses are shown in large circles. Surveillance samples characterized by HI 
assays, but not sequenced, are indicated in gray. Shown in yellow are viruses belonging to 
the minor cluster 3C.3b. The TX/50 cluster is indicated in blue. Antigenic escape mutations 
encoding HA-159F (as found for TX/50) are shown in cyan. The 3C.3a and 3C.2a clusters 
(characterized by HA-159S and HA-159Y, respectively) are indicated in green and red, 
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respectively. Viruses are numbered as follows: #1, TX/50 MK1/MDCK2 (used for virus 
library generation); #2, TX/50 HA-E172G+F193S; #3; TX/50 HA-F193S+T203A; #4, 
TX/50 HA-S219F; #5, TX/50 HA-I217T+N225K; #6, TX/50 HA-Q75L+N144I+I192T; #7, 
TX/50 HA-F174Y; #8, TX/50 HA-Y94F+N225D; #9, TX/50 HA-R220G+N225D; #10, 
TX/50 HA-N158D; #11, TX/50 HA-Q197R; #12, TX/50 HA-K207N+N225S; #13, TX/50 
HA-W127L+N225D; #14, TX/50 HA-Y94H+S107T+N225D; #15, TX/50 HA-V88I
+K189N; #16, TX/50 HA-F159Y+K160E+I192V+I242T; #17, TX/50 HA-F159Y; #18, 
TX/50 HA-L157F+N225D; #19, TX/50 HA-N144I+N158D+F193Y; #20, TX/50 HA-
N225D; #21, TX/50 HA-K189E; #22, TX/50 HA-K189E+I242M; #23, TX/50 HA-N122S
+F159Y; #24, TX/50 HA-E172D+K189E; #25, TX/50 HA-K189E+F193S; #26, TX/50 HA-
N128D+F159Y+N225D; #27, TX/50 HA-K189E+N225D; #28, TX/50 HA-H156R+F159S
+N246H/WT-NA (propagation and re-generation of viruses possessing HA-F159S+N225D 
failed; when we attempted to generate a PR8 virus with the NA gene of TX/50 and the 
TX/50 HA-F159S gene, the virus also acquired HA-H156R and N246H mutations); #29, 
TX/50 HA-F159S+N246H (propagation and re-generation of viruses possessing HA-F159S
+N225D failed; when we attempted to generate a PR8 virus with the TX/50 HA-F159S 
gene, the virus also acquired a N246H mutation); #30, A/Texas/50/2012 (E5; vaccine strain); 
#31, A/Hong Kong/4801/2014 (NYMC-263A; vaccine strain); and #32, A/Switzerland/
9715293/2013-NIB-88 (E4/E5/E2; vaccine strain).
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